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1. Introduction 
Epistemic contextualism (henceforth: contextualism) is, roughly, the semantic thesis that the truth-
conditional contribution of  “knows” vary with variations in the context of  utterance. 
Contextualism has been surrounded by methodological disputes as long as it has existed. In fact, 
a large number of  the debates that characterize contemporary meta-epistemology resemble the 
methodological disputes over contextualism. We think that this is no mere accident. Rather, the 
nature of  and motivation for contextualism naturally raise methodological questions. What is the 
proper relationship between epistemology and philosophy of  language? What is the role of  
intuitive judgments in epistemological theorizing? What is the proper response when our 
epistemological theories are incongruous with our folk epistemology? 
In this chapter, we aim to simultaneously provide an overview of  some of  the methodological 
debates surrounding contextualism and consider whether they are, in effect, based on an 
underlying methodological dispute. We proceed as follows: In Section 2, we articulate two 
questions that our discussion will address. In Section 3, we consider case-based motivations of  
contextualism and DeRose’s ‘methodology of  the straightforward.’ In Section 4, we consider the 
methodology that consists in modeling a contextualist semantics of  “knows” on other context-
sensitive linguistic phenomena. In Section 5, we consider attempts to motivate contextualism by 
appeal to imagined conceptual genealogies or functional roles. In Section 6, we discuss the 
challenges from experimental philosophy from a methodological perspective. In Section 7, we 
conclude by revisiting the question as to whether the debates over the case for contextualism are 
based on a methodological dispute. 
 
2. Contextualism and methodological disputes 
As mentioned, contextualism has since its earliest developments been surrounded by disputes of  
a methodological character. For example, its attempt to ‘dissolve’ skeptical paradoxes was 
motivated by meta-epistemological considerations such as considerations about the aims of  
epistemology (Cohen 1999, 2005; DeRose 1995, 1999, 2004; Lewis 1996). However, the 
contextualist approach was countered with meta-epistemological criticism (Schiffer 1996, 2004). 
For example, critics questioned whether a semantic thesis is apt to solve epistemological problems 
(Sosa 2000; Kornblith 2000). 
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Naturally, contextualists have responded to these methodologically oriented criticisms. But 
very often the methodological and the substantive issues have been addressed in unison. This 
raises the question as to whether contextualists ‘have a distinctive methodology’ or more 
specifically whether there are any methodological doctrines that underlie the dispute between 
contextualists and their opponents? This broad quandary is reflected in our title. But to begin to 
address this grand issue, we will articulate it a manner that is a bit more conspicuous (and 
admittedly less grand) as two distinct but interrelated meta-methodological questions. 
 
Q1: Is there a distinctive methodological doctrine or set of  methodological doctrines that is centrally invoked by 
all epistemic contextualists? 
Q2: Does the substantive dispute concerning the truth of  contextualism depend on underlying methodological 
disputes? 
 
Q1 and Q2 are logically independent. Some doctrine could be common to all contextualists 
without explaining the dispute between contextualists and their opponents—perhaps because the 
doctrine is also accepted by the majority of  the opponents. On the other hand, it might be that 
whereas contextualism is motivated by various distinct methodologies, opponents to contextualism 
are in each case in disagreement with the methodology in question. 
By structuring the discussion around these two meta-methodological questions, we hope to 
advance the debates by gaining some clarity on the various aspects of  contextualist methodology. 
We also seek to advance the debate by providing preliminary and qualified answers to the two 
questions. Roughly, we will answer Q1 by a qualified “no” and Q2 by a qualified “yes.” There is 
no single methodology or set of  methodological doctrines that is distinctive of  contextualism in the 
sense that all contextualists centrally invoke it. Nevertheless, we will suggest that each of  the 
disputes between contextualists and invariantists tend to be characterized by considerable 
methodological disputes about what epistemology is or how to motivate an epistemological theory. 
Of  course, these are complex and preliminary answers. One reason why the questions do not 
admit of  simple and conclusive answers is the noted one that both contextualists and their 
opponents tend to discuss methodological considerations in tandem with first-order substantive 
epistemological questions. So, while many contextualist writings contain meditations on matters 
methodological, the key methodological commitments of  contextualists must be articulated by 
juxtaposing these remarks with critical reflections on the contextualists’ practice. That is, the 
contextualist methodologies may to some extent be arrived at by ‘backward engineering’ from 
considerations on how contextualists go about arguing for the view, responding to criticism and 
so forth. 
In consequence, we will consider three modes of  motivation in turn: The method of  cases 
(Section 3), the appeal to linguistic analogies (Section 4) and the appeal to conceptual analogies 
and functional roles (Section 5). We will then consider the methodological debates arising from 
experimental philosophy (Section 6) and conclude by answering Q1 and Q2 (Section 7). An 
advantage of  this modus operandi is that it will also serve as an overview of  the dominant 
methodological approaches of  various contextualists. 
 
3. The method of  cases and the methodology of  the straightforward 
The most prominent way of  motivating contextualism is by appeal to case pairs with the following 
structure: Every factor that epistemologists have traditionally taken to be a partial determiner of  
whether knowledge ascribing sentences are true is held fixed, but aspects of  the speaker’s 
conversational context vary between the cases (DeRose 1995, 2009; Cohen 1999). These factors 
may involve what is at stake, or what error-possibilities are salient, or both. For example, DeRose’s 
bank cases involve the case LOW in which there is a first-person knowledge ascription in a 
conversational context where little is at stake and which does not mention any alternative to the 
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complement clause of  the knowledge ascription. This is contrasted with a case, HIGH, in which 
there is a first-person knowledge denial in a high-stakes case with a conversationally salient 
alternative (DeRose 1995, 2009: 1ff). 
DeRose claims that ordinary speakers deem the knowledge ascription true in LOW and that 
they also deem the knowledge denial true in HIGH. He claims that “where the contextualist’s cases 
are well chosen, those are fairly strong intuitions about the cases, at least where each case is 
considered individually” (DeRose 2005, 2009: 49). Thus, the motivation by cases involves 
appealing to our intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions in isolation and to assumptions 
about “how speakers in fact, and with propriety, use the claims in question” (DeRose 2009: 50). 
 
This ‘methodology of  the straightforward’, as we may call it, takes very seriously the simple 
positive and negative claims speakers make utilizing the piece of  language being studied, 
and puts a very high priority on making those natural and appropriate straightforward uses 
come out true, at least when that use is not based on some false belief  the speaker has 
about some underlying matter of  fact. Relatively little emphasis is then put on somewhat 
more complex matters, like what metalinguistic claims speakers will make and how they 
tend to judge how the content of  one claim compares with another (e.g. whether one claim 
contradicts another.) 
(DeRose 2009: 153) 
 
DeRose is cautious to mention that his attraction to the methodology of  the straightforward 
requires that “its favoring of  simple data is not taken too far” (DeRose 2009: 153). Yet the 
methodology of  the straightforward may be criticized. For example, it may be challenged on 
empirical grounds whether ordinary speakers in fact speak in this manner. We will consider this 
line of  criticism in Section 6 below. However, the methodology of  the straightforward may also 
be criticized from a more reflective standpoint. For example, it might be questioned whether it is 
reasonable to consider the positive and negative knowledge ascriptions in isolation. In many cases, 
comparative judgments allow us to see flaws in our initial judgments. The idea that it is 
methodologically more sound to reflect on comparative judgments than to rely on intuitive 
judgments in isolation is related to one of  the most tenacious substantive problems for 
contextualism—namely, the problem of  disagreement: If  Ali in HIGH utters ‘S knows that p’ and 
Adam in HIGH utters ‘S does not know that p’ they appear to disagree and, indeed, to contradict 
each other (MacFarlane 2014). Importantly, this appearance does not appear to go away on 
reflection, as one would expect if  it were simply due to the two knowledge ascriptions expressing 
different propositions (Rysiew 2001. See DeRose 2009 for a response). But critics argue that it is 
methodologically more sound to rely on reflective judgments about both utterances than on 
intuitive judgments about the utterances in isolation (Nagel 2010, Gerken 2012, Ms Ch. 3). 
Consequently, non-skeptical invariantists attempt to cast doubt on the reliability of  the intuitive 
judgment that the knowledge denial is true. One strategy consists in arguing that the utterance in 
HIGH is false but felicitous in virtue of  pragmatically conveying something true or appropriate 
(Dretske 1986; Rysiew 2001; Brown 2006; Bach 2008, 2010; Hazlett 2009; Pritchard 2010). 
Another response, that reflects the idea that we should rely on reflective comparative judgments rather 
than on intuitive isolated judgments, consists in postulating that the intuitive judgments in HIGH are 
false due to a cognitive bias (Nagel 2008, 2010; Gerken 2012, 2013; Turri 2015). 
We will not here canvass the legitimacy of  these strategies. What we want to highlight is how 
they reflect an important methodological alternative to the methodology of  the straightforward. 
Critics of  contextualism tend to argue that contextualists’ reliance on intuitive judgments about 
cases in isolation is methodologically suspect because more reflective comparative judgments are 
a better basis for epistemological theorizing. Contextualists may respond that such an approach 
may just amount to presupposing non-skeptical invariantism and diverge from how “knows” is 
actually used. To this, invariantists may respond that our ordinary talk reflects the pragmatic or 
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psychological effects that they postulate. So, the methodological discussion and substantive 
arguments are often interwoven. Thus, the methodology of  the straightforward and the invariantist 
alternative may reasonably be said to underlie the substantive debates about the plausibility of  
contextualism. 
However, it is important to recognize that contextualists do not rely exclusively on the 
methodology of  the straightforward. For example, DeRose, Lewis, Cohen, and Blome-Tillmann 
all argue that it is a theoretical advantage of  contextualism that it can (dis)solve skeptical problems 
(DeRose 1995, 2009; Lewis 1996; Cohen 1999; Blome-Tillmann 2009, 2014). Nevertheless, we 
think that the methodology of  the straightforward is primary in two important senses. First, 
contextualism is a semantic thesis about the truth conditions of  “knows” and in consequence it 
must be given a linguistic (use-based) motivation. Second, since we do not want to (dis)solve 
skeptical paradoxes by a false semantic theory, the putative ability to resolve skeptical paradoxes is 
secondary to independently motivating the semantic theory. 
Finally, we want to acknowledge approaches to LOW-HIGH cases that rely less on intuitive 
judgments. Several contextualists argue that contextualism provides the best answer to a question 
raised by commitment to non-skeptical fallibilism (Lewis 1996; Cohen 1999; Blome-Tillmann 
2014. See Brown 2013 for discussion): How good an epistemic position must S be in for it to be 
true to assert that S knows that p? The contextualist argues that there is a reason why invariantists 
have failed to answer this question. The reason, according to contextualism, is that the required 
epistemic position depends on the conversational context. Given this answer, reflection on the 
LOW-HIGH cases may be seen as augmenting this theoretical move rather than as providing self-
standing ‘data’ that a theory must account for. So, while the methodology of  the straightforward 
remains a prominent contextualist methodology underlying the appeal to LOW-HIGH case pairs, 
it may not be required in appeals to such cases in motivating contextualism. In fact, some 
contextualists do not seem to rely on it. If  the methodology of  the straightforward is merely 
prominent but not always relied upon, we should answer Q1 in the negative. On this note, let’s 
consider a prima facie distinct methodological approach. 
 
4. Linguistic analogies 
An important line of  motivation for contextualism has gone via linguistic analogies to other areas 
of  language. A number of  linguistic analogs have been suggested but here we will only briskly 
discuss two prominent candidates: gradable adjectives and universal domain restriction (See Cohen 
1999; DeRose 2009 for the former and Lewis 1996 for the latter). 
Cohen presents the analogy with gradable adjectives as follows: 
 
Many, if  not most, predicates in natural language are such that the truth-value of  sentences 
containing them depends on contextually determined standards, e.g. ‘flat’, ‘bald’, ‘rich’, 
‘happy’, ‘sad’.... These are all predicates that can be satisfied to varying degrees and that 
can also be satisfied simpliciter. So, e.g., we can talk about one surface being flatter than 
another and we can talk about a surface being flat simpliciter. For predicates of  this kind, 
context will determine the degree to which the predicate must be satisfied in order for the 
predicate to apply simpliciter. So the context will determine how flat a surface must be in 
order to be flat. 
(Cohen, 1999: 60) 
 
Thus, Cohen and other contextualists suggest that gradable adjectives such as “flat” or “rich” 
provide a semantic model for “knows”. Just as conversational context determines how much 
money it takes for the sentence “S is rich” to be true, conversational context is said to partly 
determine how much justification it takes for the sentence “S knows that p” to be true. If  the 
analogy with gradable adjectives holds, the fact that a class of  terms exhibit a semantic structure 
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similar to that postulated for “knows” may help to embed contextualism in existing semantic 
frameworks. This in turn may serve as a potential response to the objection that the contextualist 
semantics for “knows” is an epistemological invention with no parallels in natural language. 
Quantifier domain restriction provides another candidate linguistic analogy for “knows.” This 
approach most naturally takes place in a relevant alternatives framework according to which S knows 
that p only if  S can rule out every relevant alternative to p. The term “every” is context-sensitive 
insofar as the domain of  its application is partly determined by conversational context. When 
Lewis says “all the glasses are empty” he refers to all the glasses at the table, not all the glasses in 
the bar and much less all the glasses in the world (Lewis 1996). By analogy, the term “knows” is 
said to be context-sensitive insofar as the size of  the set of  alternative possibilities that is relevant 
is partly determined by conversational context. In Lewis’ memorable phrase: “S knows that p iff  S’s 
evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-p – Psst! – except for those possibilities that we 
are properly ignoring” (Lewis 1996: 554; emphasis in original. See Blome-Tillmann 2009, 2012, 
2014; Ichikawa 2011 for developments). 
The opposition takes several forms. From a methodological perspective, one brand of  
invariantist opposition to contextualism ‘plays along’ and adopts the methodological assumptions 
underlying the appeal to linguistic analogies. Such anti-contextualists seek to argue that there are 
important asymmetries between “knows” and the linguistic models that contextualists invoke. 
Stanley—an interest-relative invariantist—argues that “knows” is not gradable (Stanley 2005. See 
Blome-Tillmann 2014 for a response). Similarly, some opponents of  contextualism argue that there 
are linguistic differences between the behavior of  “knows” and other forms of  quantified domain 
restriction. For example, Stanley argues that the standards for “knows” are more easily raised than 
lowered whereas the domain restriction on many quantifiers does not exhibit a similar asymmetry 
(Stanley 2005: 65). But since those are arguments postulating linguistic disanalogies, they are not 
at odds with the basic methodology of  considering linguistic analogies. An example of  non-
invariantist who is also seeking to beat contextualists on their own linguistic turf  is MacFarlane, 
who serves up a bowl of  linguistic data to argue that relativism is superior to contextualism 
(MacFarlane 2014). We take it that the opponents of  contextualism who engage in disputes over 
the linguistic data accept that such data is methodologically appropriate for epistemological 
theorizing. 
Another line of  opposition, however, is characterized by resistance to the idea that linguistic 
analogies are methodologically appropriate for epistemological theorizing. Sometimes this line of  
resistance is articulated as the charge that contextualists are changing the topic or, in Kornblith’s 
gloss, “evading epistemology” (Kornblith 2000). One version of  this response does not object to 
contextualism or its motivation. Rather, it consists in holding that an account of  the truth-
conditions of  the term “knows” does not tell us anything of  epistemological substance (for a 
contextualist response to such worries see DeRose 2009).  
A related complaint pertains to the contextualist (dis)solution of  skeptical paradoxes (Conee 
2005; Feldman 1999, 2001, 2004; Klein 2000, 2015; Kornblith 2000; Sosa 2000, 2004; Bach 2010). 
According to this complaint, the contextualist solution is too concessive insofar as we want an 
account of  how “S knows that p” is true in a skeptical context. Contextualists are seen as shying 
away from the desired solution to the skeptical paradox that consists in indicating which premise 
is false in favor of  a semantic dissolution. Of  course, such complaints have been met with 
responses by contextualists—most elegantly by Lewis, who argues that this sort of  complaint is 
methodologically misguided because it presupposes that the skeptical paradox has a solution that 
may be asserted (Lewis 1996; see Blome-Tillmann 2014 for a development that is designed to be 
less concessive to skepticism). 
How do these considerations bear on our two methodological questions? With regard to Q1, 
the question as to whether there is a specific methodology that is centrally invoked by all 
contextualists, the considerations suggest that it should be answered in the negative. After all, the 
arguments from linguistic analogies are at least independent from the arguments from cases and 
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vice versa. With regard to Q2, the answer is less clear. On the one hand, one strand of  resistance to 
arguments from linguistic analogies is overtly methodological insofar as it consists in holding that 
such arguments are irrelevant for the purpose of  epistemological theorizing. On the other hand, 
another strand of  opposition appears to accept the methodology but seeks to beat contextualists 
on their own terms. However, this latter group may differ methodologically in how they assess the 
linguistic evidence. For example, contextualists may regard “knows” as a species of  a gradable term 
with some distinctive features whereas the opponents take these features to suggest that “knows” 
is not a gradable term at all. So, the cases of  linguistic analogy are to a significant extent shaped 
and influenced by underlying methodological disagreements. 
 
5. Conceptual genealogies and functional roles 
Another way of  motivating contextualism appeals assumptions about the social functional roles 
of  “knows” in order to reach conclusions about its semantics. This broad approach is often – 
although not invariably – inspired by Craig. 
Craig pursues what he calls a conceptual synthesis, which differs from a conceptual analysis in 
that it does not pursue necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of  the concept of  
knowledge (Craig 1986, 1990, 2007). Rather, a conceptual synthesis characterizes the concept of  
knowledge via ‘practical explication’ of  the social functions of  knowledge ascriptions. Craig does so 
via a genealogical methodology which he characterizes as follows:  
 
We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of  knowledge does 
for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role 
would be like, what conditions would govern its application. 
(Craig 1990: 2) 
 
According to Craig, the conceptual synthesis is genealogical and has two stages. The first stage 
accounts for how an ancestor to the concept of  knowledge came about in what Craig labels an 
“epistemic state of  nature” (Craig 1990). Kusch labels this precursor the concept of  protoknowledge 
(Kusch 2009, 2011). The epistemic state of  nature is an imaginary early, social community of  
language-using humans who cooperate and therefore need to depend on each other as informants. 
Hence, these humans need a concept to identify reliable informants and Craig suggests that the 
concept of  protoknowledge serves this function (Craig 1990: 11). According to Craig the features 
of  a good informant are the following: 
 
(1) He should be accessible to me here and now. 
(2) He should be recognizable by me as someone likely to be right about p. 
(3) He should be as likely to be right about p as my concerns require. 
(4) Channels of  communication between me and him should be open. 
(Craig 1990: 85) 
 
These features are highly contextualized. But they characterize a concept that is very different from 
our present concept of  knowledge. Consequently, the second stage of  Craig’s genealogy postulates 
a “process of  objectivisation” during which the contextual aspects of  the precursor concept are 
replaced with objective ones. The end-result is our concept of  knowledge. For example, the 
requirement, (3), that the protoknower should be as likely to be right about p as the inquirer’s 
concerns require is said to be “objectivized away.” Indeed it is replaced with a reliability 
requirement according to which a knower must be: “…someone with a very high degree of  
reliability, someone who is very likely to be right—for he must be acceptable even to a very 
demanding inquirer” (Craig 1990: 91). 
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Contemporary theorists adopt select ideas of  Craig’s proposal to motivate varieties of  
contextualism (Greco 2007, 2012; Hannon 2013, 2015; Henderson 2009, 2011; McKenna 2013, 
2014). It should be noted, however, that many of  these theorists part ways with Craig’s specific 
genealogical approach in favor of  a broader appeal to the functional roles of  knowledge 
ascriptions. However, the key idea that the function of  knowledge ascriptions serve to flag reliable 
informants continues to figure centrally.  
For example, Henderson’s “gate-keeping contextualism” appeals to Craig’s idea that knowledge 
ascriptions serve the central function of  gate-keeping sources in a social epistemic community 
(Henderson 2009, 2011). Crucially, Henderson assumes that the semantics constitutive of  the 
concept turns on this function:  
 
To say that a concept arose with “a constitutive eye to” the demands of  successful practice, 
and that what makes for success there is central to the “core conception” of  the concept, 
is to say that the semantics constitutive of  the concept turn on what makes for such 
success… 
(Henderson 2011: 86) 
 
Given such an assumption and the further assumption that it is a contextual matter whether it is 
reasonable to certify S as a good source of  information, contextualism may be motivated by 
genealogical considerations. Various theorists have pursued variations of  this line of  reasoning. 
For example, Greco argues that it is “the relevant practical reasoning environment” which 
determines the context in question and therefore the context may be that of  the attributor, the 
subject, or someone else (Greco 2008: 433). Henderson emphasizes that since a potential source 
is assessed for general purposes, there is some stability to the contextual variance (Henderson 
2011). Likewise, Hannon seeks to “stabilize” the content of  knowledge ascriptions so as to allow 
for a restricted contextual variance with practical factors (Hannon 2015). Since space dictates that 
we set aside differences between the proponents of  this broad strategy, we will restrict our more 
critical assessment to Craig’s approach (but see Gerken 2015, Ms). 
The genealogical approach is often rejected on the grounds that Craig’s genealogy and 
imaginary “epistemic state of  nature” are overly speculative and empirically unconstrained (Gelfert 
2011, Kelp 2011, Kornblith 2011, Beebe 2012). This way of  objecting to Craig’s methodology is 
especially damaging to appeals to it in motivating contextualism. After all, contextualism purports 
to be a semantics of  our term “knowledge.” So, if  the genealogy is at odds with the best empirical 
theories of  conceptual development, why think it bears on our concept of  knowledge and, by 
extension, on the semantics of  “knowledge”? 
This line of  objection questions the genealogical methodology and its capacity to motivate 
contextualism. As such, it exemplifies how the debate between contextualists and invariantists 
reflects a debate about philosophical methodology. This suggests an affirmative answer to Q2, the 
question as to whether the dispute between contextualists and invariantists hinges on a 
methodological dispute. On the other hand, opponents to contextualism do not have to reject the 
genealogical method. Indeed, invariantists may challenge the genealogical motivation of  
contextualism on Craigian grounds. For example, it may be noted that Craig only claims that the 
ancestor concept is heavily contextualized, not that our present day objectivized concept is (Gerken 
Ms). If  so, invariantists may accept Craig’s genealogical considerations by arguing that they do not 
on reflection motivate contextualism. Thus, invariantist criticism is, at least in principle, compatible 
with genealogical methodology. So, on balance the debates over genealogical motivations of  
contextualism suggest a more guarded answer to Q2: while the dispute between contextualists and 
invariantists often reflects an underlying methodological dispute, it need not do so. 
With regard to Q1, the question as to whether contextualism has a distinctive methodology or 
set of  principles in common, the discussion suggests a negative answer. After all, Craig’s 
conceptual synthesis and genealogical method is a highly unorthodox and distinctive alternative to 
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existing methodologies. So, since the genealogical method is a novel way to motivate 
contextualism, contextualists are not committed to a particular methodology. Moreover, the fact 
that contextualists often appeal to functional role without invoking genealogies provides evidence 
for a plurality of  contextualist methods. 
 
 
6. The challenge from experimental philosophy 
As discussed in Section 3, a prominent way of  motivating contextualism includes an empirical 
claim concerning ordinary linguistic practice. As DeRose puts it: “…what ordinary speakers will 
count as ‘knowledge’ in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others” (DeRose 
2009: 47). One type of  challenge to contextualism deploys experimental techniques to scrutinize 
this specific claim. Another type of  challenge targets more general reliance on intuitive judgments 
concerning cases in support of  this empirical claim. We will consider these challenges in reverse 
order. 
Part of  the support for the contextualist’s empirical claim stems from intuitive judgments 
about cases. Some experimental philosophers challenge this line of  support by arguing that any 
epistemically significant reliance on intuitive judgments is illegitimate. They cite several grounds 
for this assessment. For example, some argue that intuitive judgments are unreliable (Weinberg, 
Nichols, and Stich 2001; Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg 2003). Likewise, experiments are taken to 
suggest that they exhibit sensitivity to irrelevant factors (Alexander and Weinberg 2014). It is also 
suggested that they are not susceptible to systematic error-detection and correction (Weinberg 
2007; cf. Swain et al. 2008. See Wright 2010 for a response). Such challenges are general, targeting 
not just contextualism but the traditional method of  cases in general (see Knobe and Nichols 
2008; Knobe, Buckwalter, Nichols, et al. 2012; and Deutsch 2015 for helpful opinionated surveys.) 
But there are also experimental challenges more specific to contextualism to which we now turn. 
More in keeping with the “positive program” of  experimental philosophy, the contextualists’ 
empirical claim that ordinary linguistic practice with knowledge ascriptions varies with 
conversational context may be experimentally investigated. Several studies involving presentation 
of  case pairs to non-philosophers failed to find support for a practical factor (stakes) effect 
(Buckwalter 2010, 2014; May et al. 2010; Feltz & Zarpentine 2010; and see Pinillos and Simpson 
2014 for criticism). Consequently, Schaffer and Knobe raise the following concern:  
 
Strikingly, the results suggest that people simply do not have the intuitions they were 
purported to have. Looking at this recent evidence, it is easy to come away with the feeling 
that the whole contextualism debate was founded on a myth. (Schaffer and Knobe 2012: 
675). 
 
In reply, contextualists might invoke generic worries about experimental studies, such as worries 
concerning sampling bias (DeRose 2011). It might also be objected that the linguistic practice 
involved in producing survey responses is not appropriately representative of  ordinary linguistic 
practice (Cullen 2010; Kauppinen 2007). One way to flesh out this worry is to distinguish within-
case knowledge ascriptions (ascriptions made when in an actual case) from about-case knowledge 
ascriptions (ascriptions made when merely considering a description of  a case) (cf. Gerken Ms Ch. 
2, following Fodor 1964. But see Saxe 2006). The relevant studies may measure about-case 
judgments, while the contextualist’s empirical claim concerns within-case judgments. 
Another generic worry about experimental technique concerns survey design. Pinillos and 
Simpson (2014) suggest that the studies producing null results lacked statistical power. Moreover, 
the formulations of  the prompts used in these studies have been challenged. For instance, DeRose 
suggests that the details of  prompts diverge too much from the best case for contextualism 
(DeRose 2011 but see Buckwalter 2014). Relatedly, though more broadly, differences in intuitive 
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judgments may reflect nothing more than differences in how implicit background details of  
prompts are “filled in” by respondents (Sosa 2009, 2010). As both contextualists and invariantists 
have argued, stipulating details of  a case is not always sufficient to eliminate this possibility 
(DeRose 2011; Rysiew 2011; Dinges 2016). Thus, respondents are presented with a non-trivial 
cognitive task, their completion of  which remains opaque to experimenters. The worry, then, is 
that failure to ensure that participants consider the appropriate questions may threaten the 
reliability of  such surveys. 
Subsequent empirical work has begun to address these worries. Concerning the salient 
alternatives effect, Schaffer and Knobe (2012) presented respondents with prompts including 
salient alternatives that were more “vivid” (i.e. more salient). Their findings indicate a statistically 
significant salient alternatives effect on knowledge ascriptions (Buckwalter 2014; Buckwalter and 
Schaffer 2015). Further evidence for a salient alternatives effect is provided by experimental studies 
by Nagel and colleagues (Nagel et al. 2013, Nagel 2012). Their results have also been replicated 
(Alexander et al. 2014). Concerning the stakes effect, the picture is murkier. Taken together, various 
empirical studies (Sripada and Stanley 2012; Hansen and Chemla 2013; Pinillos 2012; Pinillos and 
Simpson 2014; Shin 2014) provide inconclusive but non-negligible evidence of  a practical factor 
effect on knowledge ascriptions as distinct from a simple stakes effect. Although variance of  stakes 
generates an effect in some studies, there is evidence that it does so due to a connection to action 
(e.g. Shin 2014; Buckwalter 2014; Buckwalter and Turri forthcoming). This reinforces the impression 
of  a complex practical factor effect that is driven by many moving parts rather than simply by 
stakes alone.  
How does the debate over experimental philosophy reflect upon our two questions? As for 
Q1, the question as to whether contextualists centrally invoke a distinctive methodology, the 
debates suggest a negative answer. Some contextualists embrace experimental philosophy and seek 
to promote contextualism experimentally. For example, Schaffer and Knobe 2012 motivate a 
contrastivist version of  contextualism (Schaffer and Knobe 2012; Gerken and Beebe 2016 provide 
empirical evidence to the contrary). Other contextualists argue that experimental findings ought 
to have little impact on the assessment of  contextualism (DeRose 2011). Likewise, some 
invariantists seek to compromise contextualism experimentally or by appeal to findings in 
psychology (Nagel 2008, 2010; Gerken 2012). But other invariantists are critics of  experimental 
philosophy (Sosa 2007; Brown 2012). So, contextualists and their invariantist opponents do not 
divide neatly into pro or con about experimental philosophy. 
The ramifications of  the experimental philosophy debates are less clear for Q2—the question 
as to whether disputes about contextualism reflect methodological disputes. A hasty glance at the 
debates might suggest that experimental philosophers argue against the motivation for 
contextualism whereas contextualists respond by questioning the significance of  experimental 
work. But even our cursory overview reveals that such an impression is inaccurate. As noted, both 
contextualists and invariantists use experimental data to argue for and against contextualism, 
respectively. Likewise, both contextualists and invariantists have questioned whether experimental 
work should significantly impact epistemological theorizing. Furthermore, there is some apparent 
methodological common ground between some strands of  contextualism and some strands of  
experimental philosophy—namely, the methodology of  the straightforward. Recall that DeRose 
argues that the intuitive judgments should be prioritized by putting “a very high priority” on 
making them come out true. In contrast, comparative judgments to the effect that knowledge 
ascriptions in LOW and HIGH are contradictory should be given “relatively little emphasis” 
(DeRose 2009. For criticism see Hansen 2014; Gerken Ms). Likewise, proponents of  experimental 
philosophy’s negative program appear to sometimes presuppose that laymen’s intuitive judgments 
provide strong reasons to reject conflicting theoretical claims. 
In consequence, the debates surrounding experimentalist challenges do not indicate a clear 
answer to Q2. They clearly raise a number of  methodological disputes between contextualists and 
their opponents but without dividing them along neat methodological lines. 
Does	contextualism	hinge	on	a	methodological	dispute?	
	 10 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Let us sum up how the discussion of  the various methodological strands bears on our guiding 
questions, Q1 and Q2. 
Q1 is the question as to whether central methodological doctrines are centrally invoked by all 
epistemic contextualists. We take the diversity of  the methodologies surveyed above to suggest 
that this question should be answered in the negative. For example, the appeal to an imagined 
genealogy is methodologically very far from arguments from linguistic analogies. Likewise, one 
might accept an experimental motivation for contextualism and reject the traditional method of  
cases as methodologically problematic. Consequently, we answer Q1 in the negative: There is no 
distinctive methodological doctrine or set of  methodological doctrines that is centrally invoked by all epistemic 
contextualists. 
Our discussion suggests a more qualified and reserved answer to Q2, the question as to 
whether dispute about contextualism depends on underlying methodological disputes. In each 
case, we have seen examples of  contextualist and their opponents who argue within a commonly 
presupposed methodology. On the other hand, we have also seen multiple and prominent 
examples of  methodological differences that lie at the bottom of  the first-order dispute. So, on 
balance we are inclined to answer Q2 in a highly qualified affirmative: The substantive dispute about 
the truth of  contextualism very frequently, although not invariably, reflects an underlying methodological dispute. 
This concludes our very selective discussion. Both the first-order debates about contextualism 
and the meta-epistemological debates about proper methodology are bound to go on. We have 
sought to exemplify that each of  these two levels of  debate may benefit from considering it 
explicitly in relation to the other. Contextualism about “knows” is a fruitful case for meta-
epistemology. Meta-epistemology may directly inform the first-order debates about the plausibility 
of  contextualism.1 
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